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ABSTRACT
Injection attacks are the top two causes of software errors and vulnerabilities, according to the
MITRE Common Vulnerabilities list [1]. This thesis presents a threat analysis of injection attacks
on applications built for Android, a popular but not rigorously studied operating system designed
for mobile devices. The following thesis is argued: Injection attacks are possible on off-the-shelf
Android systems, and such attacks have the capacity to compromise the device through resource
denial and leaking private data. Specifically, we demonstrate that injection attacks are possible
through the OS shell and through the SQLite API. To mitigate these attacks, we augment the
Android OS with a taint-tracking mechanism to monitor the flow of untrusted character strings
through application execution. We use this taint information to implement a mechanism to detect
and prevent these injection attacks. A good definition of an attack being critical to preventing
it, our mechanism is based on Ray and Ligatti’s formalized “NIE” property, which states that
untrusted inputs must only insert or expand noncode tokens in output programs. If this property
is violated, an injection attack has occurred. This definition’s detection algorithm, in combination
with our taint tracker, allow our mechanism to defend against these attacks.

iii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

As of January 2014, a study has shown that 58% of American adults own and use a smartphone [2]. The increasing ubiquity of this new computing platform has also opened a new battleground in computer security. Smartphones are filled with private user data such as contact
databases, call histories, camera images, and the contents of any mounted SD card. If this private
data is compromised by an attacker, it could have high value to advertisers, spammers, and stalkers.
Phones provided by the workplace may also store confidential company information, making it even
more critical to secure these devices against software vulnerabilities. A leak of sensitive company
data is a constant threat and 33% of IT professionals said that the most vulnerable points for data
leakage on some secure network are the USB storage devices [3]. Android phones, with their USB
connectivity and SD card mounting capability, fall into this category.
Android OS is an open-source mobile device operating system [4] built on the Linux kernel.
It implements a security system modeled on Linux, with several modifications. Android restricts
at install time what an application may access on the system [5, 6]. Applications declare in their
package manifest which permissions they require to run properly and these permissions are displayed
to the user when downloading an application from the Google Play store or installing an application
from any other source. The user may then choose to install the application and grant the required
permissions, or abort the install. The user cannot force an application to run with fewer permissions
than it has requested in off-the-shelf distributions of Android. There is no monitoring of how an
application uses data or services; permissions determine only whether an application may use
certain data or services.
This lack of fine-grained runtime monitoring makes Android vulnerable to injection attacks.
This thesis will argue that such attacks are possible on Android OS, through both the OS shell and
SQLite API, and that these attacks are able to compromise the device.
1

// Obtain a p r o c e s s running an OS S h e l l
P r o c e s s p r o c = Runtime . getRuntime . e x e c ( ‘ ‘ sh − i ’ ’ ) ;
// Obtain a stream t o send commands t o t h a t p r o c e s s
OutputStream programInput = p r o c . getOutputStream ( ) ;
// Obtain some u n t r u s t e d i n p u t
String userinput = getUntrustedInput ( ) ;
// C r e a t e a command w i t h u n t r u s t e d i n p u t , and e x e c u t e t h e command
programInput . w r i t e ( ‘ ‘ p i n g −c 4 ’ ’ + u s e r i n p u t + ‘ ‘ \ n ’ ’ ) ;

Figure 1.1: Java code for an Android application vulnerable to shell injection

1.1

OS Shell Injection
Consider an example application that uses user input in a simple shell program to “ping” a

remote host specified by the user. Application code for this functionality might look like the code in
Figure 1.1. This program uses the Runtime class and its method .exec() to obtain a shell running
inside an instance of the Process class called proc and obtains an OutputStream to that Process.
It then uses proc to execute a shell program that pings a remote host specified by user input with
four packets. The newline character at the end of the program instructs the shell to execute the
command given by the string preceding the newline.
Unfortunately, this application accepts input from an untrusted source. A malicious attacker
controlling that source could perform a code injection attack on the program output by the shell.
Consider the following possible input strings. The text input by the attacker is underlined for
clarity.
1. www.remotehostname.com’’ && rm -rf ‘‘data’’, to make the application output the
program ping -c 4 ‘‘www.remotehostname.com’’ && rm -rf ‘‘data’’ \n The && symbol causes the program to execute the next command, based on whether the previous command returned successfully. The first command will ping some supplied remote host name,
as expected. The second command begins with rm, the command to delete directories or
files from the filesystem. The first argument to rm is -rf, meaning that the program will
remove subdirectories and files inside the specified directory recursively without warning the
user. The second argument to rm is data, which will be used as the name of the directory
2

to delete. If data is a location containing some crucial files, this injection attack could be
very damaging.
2. www.remotehostname.com && f() { f|f& } && f \n #’’, to the make the application
output the program ping -c 4 ‘‘www.remotehostname.com’’ && f() { f|f& } && f
\n #’’ \n’’. This program inserts a subprogram via the && symbol in the same fashion
as before. The second program this time begins with the creation of a function f that
recursively executes itself indefinitely and maintains a pipe from each parent process to
each child process, to prevent the parent from terminating. It then executes this function f.
The final # character is used to start a line comment, and eliminate the unused closing quotes
from the application code. The result of this program is a full process table, preventing
the operating system from creating any new processes. To fix resource denial, the user is
required to wipe volatile memory, which might be accomplished by removing the phone’s
battery. For mobile devices that have non-removable batteries, the user might need to
wait until the device runs out of battery naturally. This attack is colloquially known as a
“forkbomb”.
In practice, these vulnerabilities might be used in the following way. The user decides to install
some application that they trust. The user gives the application permission to access a protected
resource—the SD card, say. The trusted application, unbeknownst to the user, has an injection
vulnerability like the one above and takes input from an untrusted source. An attacker could then
inject into this application and take advantage of its permission to access the SD card to read, write,
and modify files. If the target phone was holding sensitive data, the results could be disastrous.

1.2

SQLite Injection
The Android OS ships a SQLite API with its development kit. SQL injection vulnerabilities are

well studied and are the single most common vulnerability in software, according to the MITRE
Common Vulnerabilities List [1]. A SQLite database in Android is not protected by a permission
restriction in the application manifest but does have several countermeasures against injection.
The countermeasures take the form of wrapper methods to access the database [7]. These wrapper
methods all have overloads that utilize prepared statements. Prepared statements are a common
3

// C o n s t r u c t a SQLite q u e r y s t r i n g
S t r i n g query =
// Match rows where KEYVALUNAME i s e q u a l t o untrusteduname and
KEYVALUNAME + ‘ ‘ = ‘ ’ ’ + untrusteduname + ‘ ‘ ’ AND ’ ’ +
// Rows where KEYVALPASS i s e q u a l t o u n t r u s t e d p a s s
KEYVALPASS + ‘ ‘ = ‘ ’ ’ + u n t r u s t e d p a s s + ‘ ‘ ’ ’ ’ ;
// S t o r e r e s u l t s from t h e q u e r y i n t o a c u r s o r
Cursor c u r s o r = s q l d a t a b a s e . query (
// Pass t o t h e q u e r y t h e t a b l e t o s e a r c h , t h e columns t o r e t u r n
TABLEVALDEMO, new S t r i n g [ ] { KEYVALID, KEYVALUNAME, KEYVALPASS } ,
// and our q u e r y s t r i n g . Other o p t i o n a l a r g s a r e n u l l .
query , null , null , null , null , null ) ;
// I f any match was found , r e t u r n t r u e , e l s e r e t u r n f a l s e
return ( c u r s o r . moveToFirst ( ) ) }

Figure 1.2: Vulnerable Java code.

SQL injection prevention mechanism that “prepare” a SQL query before concatenating in user
input [8]. The untrusted strings are then converted to equivalent values and added to the query.
We call this behavior “string binding.” Closed values are noncode, so this protection mechanism
fully defends against injection attacks if used properly. However, applications do not automatically
implement this mechanism. The onus is on the developer to make use of these overloads. Developers
who are unfamiliar with the dangers of injection attacks might not know that they need to program
their applications securely.
An example of such a poorly coded application might look like Figure 1.2. The program is
querying a SQLite database with columns for primarykey, username and password for the existence of a particular username and password in the database, attempting to authenticate some
user. It constructs a query string that implements this behavior. Note that SQLite requires that
string literals in queries be enclosed with single quote characters. The single quote characters to
enclose untrusteduname and untrustedpass are included in the application code, before and after
concatenating in the string variables. The query string is then used as an one of the arguments
to Android’s SQLite API method .query(). The code also passes to the .query() method the
4

name of the table to be queried and which columns of information to return in the results. Other
arguments, including how to sort the results and how to group the results are left as null. The
query method returns an instance of the Cursor class, a datatype that contains the results of the
query. The code should then return true if it has found a match to the username/password combination in the database and false otherwise. The .moveToFirst() method of the Cursor class
implements exactly that behavior, returning false if the Cursor is empty, and true otherwise. This
is a standard example of how a SQLite database might be queried in an Android application. If
the source of untrusteduname and untrustedpass are controlled by an attacker, an injection attack
could be executed on this application code.
Consider the following example. Suppose that our example database from Figure 1.2 contains
only 1 entry—the entry for the administrator account. The username for the administrator account
is “admin” and the password is “adminpass”. According to our specifications, the code in Figure 1.2 should only return true if untrusteduname and untrustedpass each match the credentials
on some row in the database. A malicious attacker attempts to authenticate to the application with
username ‘‘admin’’ and password ‘‘ ’ OR‘1’=‘1’’. This results in the query String query =
KEYVALUNAME + ‘‘ = ‘ ’’ + admin + ‘‘ ’ AND ’’ + KEYVALPASS + ‘‘ = ‘ ’’ + ’OR‘1’=‘1
+ ‘‘’ ’’.
Our example database should reject this authentication attempt. The values passed into the
.authenticate() method by the attacker do not match the values for the user account stored in
the database.
This application code does not reject the authentication attempt as desired. The username is
matched as normal but the password provided is not tokenized as a string literal. Instead, the first
single quote in the untrusted input closes the string literal that should have contained the password
to match against the password field in the database. The untrusted input then injects an extra OR
token and an equality expression ‘1’=‘1. Recall that SQLite also requires that literals be enclosed
with single quotes. The single quote to the right hand side of the final number ‘1’ is left absent in
the user provided string because the trusted query string has one already—the single quote that
would have closed the password string literal. This injection results in the SQL query matching all
rows where the column KEYVALUNAME is equal to “admin” and rows where the column KEYVALPASS
is equal to “ ” or where “1 = 1”. The equation “1 = 1” is, of course, a tautology, resulting in
5

// C o n s t r u c t t h e q u e r y s t r i n g marking u s e r i n p u t l o c a t i o n s w i t h ? ’ s .
S t r i n g query = KEYVALLOGIN + ‘ ‘ =? ’ ’+ ‘ ‘AND’ ’ + KEYVALPASS + ‘ ‘=? ’ ’ ;
// Pass t o t h e q u e r y method t h e t a b l e t o s e a r c h ,
Cursor c u r s o r = db . query (TABLEVALDEMO,
// t h e columns t o r e t u r n , t h e q u e r y s t r i n g
new S t r i n g [ ] { KEYVALID, KEYVALLOGIN, KEYVALPASS } , query ,
// and S t r i n g a r r a y c o n t a i n i n g u n t r u s t e d i n p u t t o be bound as l i t e r a l s
new S t r i n g [ ] { untrusteduname , u n t r u s t e d p a s s } , null , null , null , null ) ;

Figure 1.3: Code for an application that uses Android’s SQL injection security mechanism

the query matching every row in the database. A row is returned, so the conditional at the end
of the code returns true and the malicious user successfully authenticates to the database, despite
not providing a valid username/password combination.
The injection attack described above was made possible by a poorly programmed application.
The code of an equivalent application that takes advantage of Android’s protection mechanisms
would look like the code in Figure 1.3. This application code makes use of a prepared statement.
The programmer can use a prepared statement by marking areas where untrusted input will be
used in the query with ‘?’ characters. The example code does this for both the untrusuteduname
and untrustedpass strings. Then, when the SQLite API method is called with our query string,
the fourth argument is used to pass in a String array containing the untrusted strings. It is then
the task of the API method to insert the untrusted strings into the query and ensure that they are
bound as literals, meaning that the untrusted strings will be tokenized as literals only. The new
secure application, instead of searching for rows for which either the password value is the empty
string or the equation “1 = 1” is true, will now search for rows for which the password value is
’ OR ‘1’=‘1. Since there is no row with that password in our example database, the query returns
no rows, the conditional statement correctly returns false, and the injection attack is prevented.
This mechanism for preventing SQL injection attacks is present in the off-the-shelf Android OS
but is not automatic for all databases. The onus is on the programmer to understand why these
overloads are important and to use them properly in their code to secure their application against
injection attacks.
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So far as we have been able to determine, there is no reason why an application developer would
not want to use the provided SQLite security mechanisms, if s/he were aware of them. If there is no
penalty for using the protection mechanism, why is SQL injection still a problem? The documentation for the SQLiteDatabase class describes the argument used to implement prepared statements
as “You may include ?’s in selection, which will be replaced by the values from selectionArgs, in
order that they appear in the selection. The values will be bound as Strings. [7]” This explanation
makes no mention of what string binding is or why it is important to protect the application from
injection attacks. The lack of detail might lead a developer unaware of the dangers of injection
attacks to forego using the security mechanism, leaving their code vulnerable to injection attacks.
In addition, prepared statements have been a feature of the Android OS since API level one—the
initial release of Android in 2008. Despite the existence of these prepared statements, SQL injection
continues to be a problem. Clearly, many developers are not understanding or simply neglecting
to use these security features.

1.3

Summary of Contributions
This thesis has been written on the results of a collaborative research project. It is important

to note which parts of this thesis are my work alone, which parts are the work of my peers, and
which parts are a collaborative effort.
I am exclusively responsible for the taint tracking module of the protection mechanism and the
conception of the original idea of the ping drain and card wipe exploits.
I worked jointly with Clayton Whitelaw on the detection portion of the protection mechanism
and on the survey of existing Android applications.
I worked jointly with Hebron George, Ishan Mitra, and Clayton Whitelaw on the survey of the
capabilities of the Android shell.
The original idea for this research into injection atttacks on Android was proposed by Jay
Ligatti and Donald Ray. The formal definition of the NIE property on which this work is based is
attributed to them as well [9].

7

1.4

Thesis Outline
This thesis makes two high-level contributions. First, we analyze the effectiveness of injection

attacks on Android OS. Included in this analysis is a confirmation that such attacks are possible
on the on both the OS shell and SQLite database, through the APIs provided by Android. We
also demonstrate that these attacks have the capacity to compromise the target device and discuss
which types of attacks may be executed depending on which permissions the target application
has obtained. Finally, we will determine whether such vulnerabilities are present in applications
currently released on Google Play and whether application developers are likely to include these
vulnerabilities in their applications.
Our second contribution is the development and implementation of an extension to the Java
libraries used by Android OS that attempts to prevent injection attacks. Any mechanism that
attempts to precisely defend against injection attacks must precisely define an injection attack.
This paper will utilize the definition developed by Ray and Ligatti [9, 10], which stipulates that
for all applications that generate output programs based on untrusted input, the untrusted input
must only cause the insertion or expansion of noncode tokens. Our extension to the Android OS
libraries is itself in two parts. The first part consists of a proof of concept taint tracking module,
which monitors the flow of untrusted input through an application’s execution. The second part
is a detection module, which contains an implementation of the detection algorithm described in
Ray and Ligatti’s work [9]. Components of this implementation include a classification of SQL
and OS shell tokens into code and noncode, implementations of SQLite and OS shell lexers, and
an implementation of the detection algorithm itself. Finally, we present data on the performance
overhead of our implementation and its effectiveness in preventing code injection.
This thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses previous work on Android security, taint tracking, and the definition of
and defense against code injection attacks,
• Chapter 3 details the implementation of SQLite and the OS shell in Android. We cover how
these two applications are accessed, what protections exist for them, how injection into them
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occurs, and why these protections might be ignored by an application developer. We also
demonstrate several example attacks on these applications.
• Chapter 4 discusses the formal definition of a BroNIE, the defintion of an injection attack
used by this thesis.
• Chapter 5 covers the development of our prevention mechanism, detailing the implementation
methods and demonstrating its effectiveness.
• Chapter 6 discusses our results, summarizes runtime overhead data, and concludes.

9

CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK

This chapter covers other research into topics related to this thesis. Although not rigorously
studied, work has been done on the security of the Android OS, with a large focus on its mechanism
of granting permissions to applications at install time. Previous work in the area of formalizing a
definition of injection attacks, another focus of this thesis, is cited and compiled here but discussed
in full detail in Chapter 4. Taint tracking as a general topic has received a significant amount of
study, due to its usefulness in defense against injection attacks. Research into taint tracking on
Android has been focused more on its ability to implement runtime data flow policies, a feature not
present in the off-the-shelf Android operating system. These runtime dataflow polices are useful to
monitor how sensitive user data is used by an application.

2.1

General Android Security
Analysis and discussion of existing Andriod security mechanisms, including their implementa-

tion, has been discussed in [11]. Android creates a unique user id for each new installed application.
This user id is granted permissions in the system on creation based on the application manifest,
an XML file contained in the installation package of the application. The permissions specified at
install time determine the capabilities the application has at runtime.
The install time permissions system relies on the “reputation” of an application. Decisions by
the user to grant permissions to an application must be made before the application is ever used.
Once an application is installed, it may use the permissions given in any way it desires. There
are no protections for how the permissions are used—only whether they are usable. The lack of
runtime permissions and protections could lead to user data being used by some application in a
way that the user might wish to prevent. For example, an application might purport to only send
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anonymized user location data to their own database but is in reality sending user-tagged data to
advertisers.
Previous works on exploits and vulnerabilities on Android [12] have studied phishing attacks
and privilege escalation. Privilege escalation is a technique also used in applications for “rooting”
a mobile device. Rooting a mobile device is the process of circumventing system protections to
obtain root user privileges on the device. Rooting is usually used to install modifications to the
default operating system, or to install an entirely new operating system.
Privilege escalation can also be achieved by using multiple applications communicating, as
discussed in [13]. If some application obtains the internet access permission from the system, it can
then transmit the data it obtains from the internet via one of several communication channels to
another application that does not have the internet permission. The first application functions as
a medium, passing information to and from the internet and the second application. In this way,
two applications can both use the permission to access some resource, but the user is only notified
that one of the two is using the resource.
Research has been done on statically analyzing applications from the store, enabling users to
determine before installing some appliction whether it is malware [14, 15]. Malicious applications
are one of the primary concerns in Android security, given that application data usage is not
monitored at runtime in off-the-shelf Android systems. Being able to detect malicious applications
statically would allow for warnings to be posted on suspected malicious applications in the store,
to warn users.

2.2

Theory of Injection Attacks
A significant body of work has been done on a precise and formal definition of injection attacks.

It is critical, in order to develop a adequate prevention mechanism, to define when these attacks
occur [16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Previous works exhibit false positives and false negatives when faced
with programs that inject only noncode tokens through tainted input. This thesis uses the NIE
property [9, 10], which states that applications that generate output programs may not allow
anything other than the insertion or expansion of noncode tokens from untrusted input in their
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output programs. This definition avoids the drawbacks of previous work. A more detailed definition
of a BroNIE will be discussed in Chapter four.

2.3

Taint Tracking
Taint tracking is the technique of marking data from some untrusted source with taint infor-

mation and propagating that taint information though the execution of the program. Programs
may then make policy enforcement decisions based on whether data is marked as untrusted. This
information is especially useful for preventing injection attacks. The NIE property uses the idea of
untrusted input in its definition to determine when injected symbols cause bad behavior in output
programs.
Previous work on tracking tainted inputs has been done on a variety of platforms including Java
applications [21, 22, 23] and Javascript [24]. Web Servers running Java frequently interface with
SQL databases, making providing mechanisms designed to prevent SQL injection with accurate
taint information a valuable research target.
Diglossia, a prevention mechanism for PHP requests [22], uses shadow characters to propogate
taint information. Shadow characters are stored separately from ordinary characters and are not
able to be used in the remainder of the program. At the point where some output program is
generated, two distinct parsers are executed on the program string and the shadow of the program
string. One parser accepts only ordinary program characters and the other accepts program characters and shadow characters. Injections are detected by comparing the parse tree results of the
dual parsers and searching for differences.
There has also been platform-independent work on taint tracking. One paper focuses instead
on the enforcement of some arbitrary policy [25], in addition to discussion of the “privilege hijack”
attack. A privilege hijack attack can be said to occur when some program with legitimate privileges
granted by the system is exploited, allowing the attacker privileges on the system that they would
not ordinarily have through the program that they now control. Another paper examines syntax
embedding [26], a technique that allows some source language to generate a program in some target
language, with the source language aware of the syntax of the target language. This awareness
allows the source language to take measures against injection attacks.
12

Taint tracking on Android OS has also been studied [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Challenges in taint
tracking include the tradeoffs between the overhead of the system and its accuracy. Tracking of
taint through all program variables carries a high performance cost. Compromises can be made to
track only strings and characters, to reduce the load on the system. Much of the work into taint
tracking on Android has been done for the purpose of extending Android’s security mechanisms,
which are restricted to permissions at install time for off-the-shelf Android. Marking and tracking
the flow of private data through untrusted applications would allow Android to enforce policies
about how the data and services are used. For instance, some policy enforcer might instrument
method calls that perform network activity. If marked private data, such as contact databases, call
histories, user images, or the contents of the SD card, are passed to the internet through one of
these methods, an exception is thrown, and the transfer does not succeed. Concerns about mobile
devices being increasingly used to store private data have given focus to this work.

13

CHAPTER 3
ATTACK SURFACES

In this chapter, we analyze the injection attacks we have discovered on Android OS. We analyze
how each entry point may be exploited by an attacker and provide examples of exploits that might
be used on vulnerable applications in the real world.

3.1

SQLite
A SQLite API is included in the Android SDK, for use by application developers. This API

creates a local database for the application, as one of several options available to the developer for
data storage. No declared manifest permission is required to use this database API. Data is inserted
into and retrieved from the database by way of wrapper methods. There are wrapper methods for
the insertion of rows through .insert(), deletion of rows through .delete(), updating of rows
through .update(), and querying the database through .query() and .rawQuery(). A final
wrapper method, .execSQL(), covers the execution of any commands not covered by the first four,
such as the dropping of entire tables. All five of the SQLite methods carry overloads that make
use of prepared statements [8]. The overloads take an additional array of strings as an argument.
These strings will be bound as values before being passed into the SQL command, forcing them to
be tokenized as string literals. Since the untrusted input can only be a string literal, an attacker
cannot use input passed to a wrapper method in this fashion to inject code into a SQLite query.
However, as discussed in the introduction, using this protection mechanism is not an automatic
feature of the SQLite implementation in Android. The programmer must go out of their way to
use the appropriate method overload, and they must organize their query string with question
marks in the appropriate places. Our mechanism for preventing injection attacks into SQLite
is automatic, not requiring knowledge or intervention from the programmer, an advantage over
off-the-shelf Android.
14

The vulnerability into SQLite, if exhibited by applications on the Google Play store, could leak
sensitive data to an attacker from the database. To determine whether or not is it present in the real
world, we conducted a study on the top 78 downloaded applications on the Google Play store for the
vulnerabilities we have described. To perform our analysis, we first used “APKTool” [32], software
that can decode Android applications from .apk format into Dalvik Virtual Machine bytecode.
After obtaining this bytecode, we can use tools like grep, the Linux file search utility, to search
through it and find potentially unsafe method invocations. Specifically, we searched for invocations
of .execSQL(), .rawQuery(), and .query() methods that have passed “null” as their prepared
statement argument. The lack of a safety argument suggests that if unsafe input is being used in the
query, it is not being concatenated into the query properly. Our search returned 35 source files that
exhibited this unsafe behavior while using the .rawQuery() method, and 55 source files that used
.query() and .execSQL(). Our results suggest that some application developers are not aware
of, or choose not to use, the protection mechanisms available to them through the SQLite API.
We attempted to search through these potentially vulnerable applications and locate a concrete
example of a SQL injection attack onto an application on the store. Lack of a static dataflow
analysis tool and the fact that the majority of the applications were obfuscated made it necessary
to inspect the code by hand. In our manual inspection, we were only able to find instances where
trusted strings were passed to an unsafe query. As a result, we were unable to verify the existence
of any such vulnerable application in our search.

3.2

OS Shell
To access the OS shell, an application may use the Runtime class as in Figure 1.1, which

represents the computer in which the Java VM is running. Applications may obtain an instance
of this Runtime class and then create processes running on the parent computer by calling the
.exec() [33]. These processes can be any program accessible from the command line, including
ls, sh, rm, and so on. The .exec() method may be called on either a string array or a simple
string. In the case of the string array, the first element of the array is used as the program name
to be executed and any remaining elements as the arguments to that program. In the case of the
plain string, the .exec() method splits the input string by its whitespace and parses it into a
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string array. The rules for execution then proceed the same as if the programmer had passed in a
string array to begin with. For example, the string rm -rf datadirectory would be parsed into
a command to execute the program rm, with -rf as the first argument, and datadirectory as the
second.
A second class is also available to create operating system processes—the Process Builder
class [34]. Process Builder separates the setting of the command and the starting of the process
into the .command() and .start() methods respectively. Commands may be passed as single
strings or a list of strings to the command method. The parsing of a plain string into a list
of strings is also implemented with a whitespace split, the same algorithm used in the .exec()
method. The programmer may then call the .start() method to create the process and begin
execution.
The functionality of these two classes raises an important point. These classes do not themselves
connect directly to the shell of the Android OS. Commands into these method calls are not parsed as
shell programs. Only a simple program lookup is performed on the first string in the command array.
The remainder of the command is passed directly to the program being executed as arguments. Due
to this, injection attacks into the shell such as the one demonstrated in Figure 1.1 are not possible
into these methods. Only if an attacker is given control over the full program string can they
choose which program is being executed. If given control over only a single program argument in a
string array, the attacker would only be able to modify that single argument. If the attacker’s input
were to be concatenated into a command string, the attacker would be able to insert additional
program arguments. For example, if the command passed to .exec() or .command() was “‘‘ping
-c 4’’ + untrustedinput”, the attacker could input -i .2 www.nameofhost.com , resulting in
the following string: ping -c 4

-i .2 www.nameofhost.com. Because these methods split the

command string by whitespace, the attacker will have added two additional arguments to the
program, -i and .2. This would decrease the interval between sending packets to one fifth of a
second.
In order to perform a full code injection into the OS shell of an Android device, an application on
the system must first obtain a Process that is running a full shell, as in example 1.1. The example
application has a full shell running inside the Process ‘proc’, and our research indicates that
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commands passed to this shell will be parsed and executed as shell programs, allowing injections
like the one discussed in the introduction to be performed.
Having identified this OS shell vulnerability, we next examine whether this vulnerability is
likely to exist in practice. First, consider whether an application developer would even need to
use the Android shell for any functionality. It is possible that all of the OS programs accessible
through the shell are implemented in the Android SDK. However, our research indicates that this
is not the case. The Android SDK does not implement a ping program. An application developer
could perhaps write their own ping program using the available socket tools native to Java but no
ping program exists off the shelf in Android, except through the native ping program accessible
through the shell. Application developers can also use the shell to determine if the device their
application is being run on is “rooted”. Application developers might also be more comfortable
performing certain functionality in a familiar environment to them. Those more comfortable with
shell scripting than with the Android SDK might choose to obtain a shell over working with the
Android SDK.
Now that we know that an application developer has reason to access the OS shell, we must
examine the benefits to the application developer of obtaining a full shell to execute these programs,
instead of simply using the .exec or .command(). Recall that only the full shell is vulnerable to
the attacks we have discovered. The most obvious potential benefit is processing overhead. If the
developer decides to obtain a full shell and execute a series of OS programs using it, the overhead of
calling the .exec() method is removed with the exception of the first .exec() call needed to obtain
the full shell. The developer can then use the Process containing the shell to execute commands
without the need for additional calls to .exec().
To determine exactly how much processing time is saved, we performed runtime analysis on a
test application that we created. The code that performs the testing is shown in Figure 3.1. The
test application uses the System class, and its static method .nanoTime() to time how long it takes
to perform an amount of shell tasks specified by the user, both through obtaining a full shell and
through using calls to the .exec() method for each task. One call to .nanoTime() is performed
before the tasks begin and the value is stored. When the tasks are complete, another call is made.
The difference between these two values is the time, in nanoseconds, that elapsed during the test.
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The data we collected is compiled in the graph in Figure 3.2. The number of milliseconds to
complete the tasks is shown on the y axis and the number of tasks to be completed is shown on
the x axis. It’s obvious that using the interactive shell, shown with the solid line, has an execution
time that grows very slowly with the number of tasks to be executed. Using individual .exec()
method calls, shown by the dotted line, grows in execution time far more quickly in comparison.
The inconsistency in the data for task numbers 18, 19, and 20 for the individual .exec() method
calls could be the result of a process swap in the middle of the test. The process swap would
stop the shell tasks from executing for some time, while the system time value would continue to
increase. This time spent doing no work would lead to longer execution times than in the rest of our
tests. Using individual .exec() method calls is only faster than using an interactive shell for the
execution of a single task and it is only faster by 11 milliseconds. This graph demonstrates a clear
motivation for an application developer to use a full shell to perform tasks in their application—it
has the potential to save a significant amount of processing time if many OS tasks are being run
over the execution of the application.
In a continuation of our work analyzing applications for SQLite vulnerabilities, we decompiled
and analyzed the same set of 78 top applications on Google Play for shell vulnerabilities. Using
the the same bytecode search methods with APKTool, we searched for invocations of the .exec or
.start methods. In the majority of applications, we found that the .exec method call was used at
some point in the code, indicating that application developers are aware of its existence and have
found it to be useful. Several applications did obtain a full shell but passed only constant strings
as programs into the shell. The potential for a vulnerability exists in the shell but we have been
unable to verify an application that exhibits this vulnerability among the top 78 applications on
Google Play.

3.3

Possible Attacks into OS Shell
With our analysis of the shell vulnerability complete, we now move on to a survey of what

functionality is available through the shell and what behaviors exist that a malicious attacker could
abuse. Recall that the Android OS uses an install-time permission system. This system is implemented by each distinct application having its own user id, with the permissions the application has
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Figure 3.1: Code for our timing test application

Figure 3.2: A graph showing timing data gathered from the test application.
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requested attached to that id. Our research indicates that when an application obtains a full shell,
that shell operates with the same permissions as that user id. The permissions of the application
to be injected into affect what exploits an attacker injecting into the application has access to.
We have discovered three major exploits made possible by this vulnerability.
1. Ping Drain (Internet Permission Required) – Mobile devices can connect to the internet
through a Wi-Fi connection, or though the mobile data network, where data is transmitted
through cell base towers. Most cell providers have limitations and caps for “data” access to
their network. An attacker can use the ping program, with a maximum size packet (65535
bytes) at the shortest interval (5/sec) to use 3MB/sec of data. If running constantly, this
program could very quickly accrue a large amount of mobile data usage, leading to the user
being assessed an excessive mobile phone bill, or simply being unable to use their mobile
network data access for the remainder of the billing period.
2. Card Wipe (External Storage Permission Required) – The external storage permission gives
an application read and modify permissions for the entire external storage. External storage
for an Android device usually takes the form of an SD card. If an application with this
permission were to be injected into, the attacker would have access to all data mounted on
the SD card’s filesystem. The attacker can read private data or delete some or all of the
contents of the SD card.
3. Fork Bomb (No Permissions Required) – Android applications are restricted in the number
of processes they may create but very loosely. A normal app may create up to 6656 processes.
This number is more than enough processes to execute a resource denial attack by way of
a forkbomb and lock up the target device.
We believe that these exploits into the OS shell and the lack of automatic SQL injection prevention are a significant enough concern to warrant implementing a security mechanism to mitigate
these injection attacks on Android.
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CHAPTER 4
A REVIEW OF BRONIES

To begin our efforts to implement a mechanism to defend against injection attacks, it is vital to
decide on a formal definition of attacks. Without knowledge of what the attacks are at a low level,
any protection mechanism is bound to have flaws. Our protection mechanism is based on Ray and
Ligatti’s definition of a BroNIE [9].
A BroNIE begins, at a high level, when some output program is generated by using tainted
input. If the addition of this tainted input causes anything besides the expansion or insertion of
noncode tokens in the target programming language, a BroNIE has occurred. To define the formal
details of a BroNIE, Ray and Ligatti have constructed multiple subdefinitions. We review them in
the following sections and demonstrate that this definition correctly identifies the injection attacks
we have described earlier in this thesis.

4.1

Template String
In order to determine whether a token has been expanded or inserted by the addition of tainted

input, we must first examine the original output program string, before the tainted input was
added. To do this, we determine the string template. The template string is the same as the
output string, but all tainted characters have been replaced with the ‘ε’ character, to represent the
empty string. The only purpose of the ‘ε’ character in the template is to act as a placeholder in
the program string, representing a location where an injected symbol once was. They are otherwise
ignored by the tokenizer. For example, the template of the string ping ‘‘www.hostname.com’’ is
ping ‘‘www.εεεεεεεε.com’’.
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4.2

Token Expansion
Token expansion in the BroNIE definition describes how tainted input is permitted to enlarge

existing tokens. Tokens are defined in terms of what kind of token they are, the semantic value
of the token, and the range of indices over which the token appears in the program string. We
represent tokens in this thesis with the form τi (tokensymbols)j , representing a token of type τ ,
composed of symbols “tokensymbols’ and ranging from character index i to character index j in the
program string. For example, the string “2 + 10 * 3” would be tokenized as {INT1 (2)1 , PLUS3 (+)3 ,
INT5 (10)6 , MULT8 (∗)8 , INT10 (3)10 }.
A token τ can be said to expand another token τ 0 if and only if:
1. The token types of the two tokens are equal.
2. The character indices of token τ are equal to, or an expansion of, the character indices of
token τ 0 .
3. The semantic value of token τ 0 is a subsequence of the semantic value of token τ .
As an example, consider the string ping ‘‘www.hostname.com’’ again. Recall that the template of this string is ping ‘‘www.εεεεεεεε.com’’. The token for the string literal representing
the hostname in the template would be thus: LITERAL6 (www..com)21 . The token for the string
literal in the original program would be LITERAL6 (www.hostname.com)21 . Note that the epsilon
characters preserve the character indices of the template string’s token, despite the tainted input
being removed. By this definition of token expansion, the original program token expands the
template string’s token.

4.3

Token Classification
To detect BroNIEs for some output programming language, we must first partition the tokens of

the target language into code and noncode tokens. Code tokens are reducible by evaluation, meaning
that computation can be performed on them at runtime. A code token might be the ping operator.
This token specifies a program to be executed, obviously necessitating some computation. Noncode
tokens are the opposite; they are already values, so no computation can be performed on them.
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An example noncode token might be the String token with semantic value ”www.hostname.com”.
This is a String value and cannot be evaluated any further than it has been already.
Again considering our example of ping ‘‘www.hostname.com”, shell strings can all be classified
under the token WORD. WORD tokens can themselves be split into 3 different token types: code,
open value, and literal. Of these three types, only the literal type is noncode. This string could
thus be fully tokenized as {CODEWORD1 (ping)4 , LITERAL6 (www.hostname.com)21 }.
4.4

The NIE Property
Finally, we can formally define the NIE property. Given some program string s and the template

t(s), the NIE property holds if and only if it is possible to create s from t(s) by inserting or
expanding noncode tokens. If this cannot be achieved, we say that the output program exhibits
a BroNIE. Continuing with our example from the rest of the chapter, we examine the string
ping www.hostname.com and its template ping www.εεεεεεεε.com. As discussed in the previous
example, the LITERAL token in the output program is an expansion of the LITERAL token in
the template program, and the CODEWORD token is unchanged in the template string. Thus, we
can conclude that this example does not exhibit a BroNIE.

4.5

Stopping a BroNIE
Let us now examine the example injection attacks into Android that we discussed in the

introduction and determine whether the definitions discussed in this chapter classify them as
BroNIE’s. Consider the first example shell injection program from the introduction: ping -c
4 ‘‘www.remotehostname.com’’ && rm -rf ‘‘data’’ \n. As before, tainted input is marked
by underlining. First, we create a template of this string, as follows: ping -c 4 ‘‘εεεεεεεεεεε
εεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεεε’’ \n. The original program string is tokenized as {CODEWORD1 (ping)4 , ARGUMENT6 (-c)7 , LITERAL9 (4)9 , LITERAL11 (“www.hostname.com”)26 , &&28
(&&)29 , CODEWORD31 (rm)32 , ARGUMENT34 (-rf)36 , LITERAL38 (“data”)45 , NEWLINE46 (\n)
47 }.

The template string can be tokenized as: {CODEWORD1 (ping)4 , ARGUMENT6 (-c)7 , LITE-

RAL9 (4)9 , LITERAL11 (“”)45 , NEWLINE46 (\n)47 }. In order to convert from the template token
stream to the original token stream, we will at the very least need to add the token &&28 (&&)29 .
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&& is a code token—it can be reduced by evaluating the expressions on either side of it. Since
adding code tokens is against the NIE property, this program exhibits a BroNIE. In similar fashion,
the other shell program discussed in the introduction: ping -c 4 ‘‘www.remotehostname.com’’
&& f() { f|f& } && f \n #’’ \n’’” injects an && token and the template string will be unable
to add it back to restore itself to the program string in a way that satisfies the NIE property. This
program too, exhibits a BroNIE.
Finally, we examine our SQLite example string from the introduction, shown here as a query
string,

not

a

snippet

of

Java

code:

SELECT FROM ‘accounts’ WHERE KEYVALUNAME=

‘admin’ AND KEYVALPASS=‘’ OR ‘1’=‘1’. This string’s template is as follows: SELECT FROM
accounts WHERE KEYVALUNAME=‘εεεεε’ AND KEYVALPASS=‘εεεεεεεεεεεεε’ The program string’s
tainted

input

areas

will

be

tokenized

as:

{STRING43 (‘admin’)49 }

and

{STRI-

NG67 (’)67 , OR68 (OR)69 , STRING71 (‘1’)73 , EQUALS74 (=)74 , STRING75 (‘1)76 }. The same tainted
areas in the template string will be tokenized as:
67 ,(‘’)76 }.

{STRING43 (‘’)49 } and {STRING-

Clearly, there are many code tokens present in the program string that do not ap-

pear in the template string. This program too, exhibits a BroNIE. All of our example attacks
from the introduction have now been successfully detected by the NIE property and its associated
definitions.
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CHAPTER 5
PROTECTION MECHANISM IMPLEMENTATION

Having explored the surfaces through which injection attacks can occur on Android and defined
formally how injection attacks occur, we can now implement a mechanism to defend against these
attacks. There are two high-level components to this mechanism, the taint tracker and the detection
algorithm. The taint tracker applies taint data to characters from untrusted sources and propagates
that taint information in strings through the execution of the application. The detection algorithm
will then use the taint information supplied by the taint tracker to generate the template string
described in Chapter four. The detection algorithm compares the template string and the original
string. If it finds that the original string cannot be reached from the template string by inserting
or expanding noncode tokens, it throws an exception and the program or query is not executed [9].

5.1

Taint Tracker
In our modifications to the Java libraries used by Android OS, taint information is stored for

each String in the system as a boolean array, with one bit for each character. A false bit appears
for a specified character if and only if that character is untainted and a true if and only if the
character is tainted. Taint information should be linked to each string on creation. An “untrusted”
source would mark the full string created from it with taint bits.
It would be convenient to modify the String class directly and add our taint tracking information as a field to it. However, the Android OS performs some VM-level optimization with the
String class. The bit-level offsets of the fields in the class are hardcoded into other sections of the
OS, making adding fields to the String class difficult.
To circumvent this problem, we have implemented our taint information in a separate class, a
new addition to the Java libraries. We call it the TaintTrack class. It is inserted into the Java.lang
package, alongside the String class. Selections of code from the class are displayed in Figure 5.1.
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The primary data structure used by the class is a HashMap, which stores taint information for a
particular string keyed by the hash code of the string being stored. The class implements methods
for adding untainted and tainted strings or character sequences to the HashMap. The character
sequence adding method must first convert the character sequence to an instance of the String
class. Both methods then allocate a boolean array of the size of the string and fill it with the
appropriate taint data (false for untainted, true for tainted.) In Figure 5.1, only the methods for
adding a tainted character sequence and an untainted string are shown. The methods for adding an
untainted character sequence and a tainted string require only trivial alterations from the methods
we have shown. There is a method for retrieving the taint information for a specific string, for which
the code needs only access the HashMap. Finally, there is a method for updating taint information
after two strings have been concatenated. For this method, a boolean array of the combined size
of the strings is allocated, and the taint information for the two original strings is retrieved and
combined together into the result array. The result array is then placed into the HashMap, under
the hash code of the final concatenated string.
Now that we have added all of the necessary helper methods to track taints, our implementation
must call them from the appropriate locations in the Java libraries and application code. To begin,
we instrumented the String class to add all created strings as untainted by default using the
.addStringUntainted() method from Figure 5.1. Tainted strings, in our example implementation,
are obtained from a text box in the application’s UI. The method for obtaining the text that a user
has entered into a text box is .getText() from the TextView class. We have instrumented the
.getText() method with the .addCharSeqTainted() method from Figure 5.1 to taint all strings
created through it. In a full implementation of this mechanism, the developer might wish to specify
other sources as tainted, and instrument those sources as well. For our example implementation, a
single taint source is sufficient to demonstrate the efficacy of the system.
Next, we must call our string concatenation tracking method from the Java code. To do this,
it is important to know how the Java compiler handles the “+” operator on two strings. It first
instantiates an instance of the StringBuilder class, with the string on the left hand side as its
data. Then, it calls the .append() method of the StringBuilder class, with the string on the right
hand side as its argument. Finally, it builds the string, and returns the result. It would be simplest
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Figure 5.1: Code for the taint tracking module we have added to the Java libraries
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Figure 5.2: AspectJ code to call the taint tracker from application code

to instrument the .append() method of the StringBuilder class, but it also uses optimization at
the VM level and we were unable to instrument it inside the source code for the Java libraries.

5.2

Weaving with AspectJ
To circumvent this problem, our implementation makes use of a tool called AspectJ, a program-

ming language for weaving through source code. Weaving is the act of adding specific code snippets
at specific points, declared by the programmer. To obtain the desired behavior, we programmed an
AspectJ file to instrument the appropriate method calls. A code snippet from this file is displayed
in Figure 5.2. The code begins by declaring a piece of advice, the class structure for AspectJ. It
then specifies that this advice will weave “around” any calls to the .append() method. Recall from
Figure 5.1 that our method to update taint information after concatenation requires the strings
used for concatenating and the result of the concatenation. For this reason, we wrap fully around
the call to .append() and not just before or after it. Before the .append call is executed, our code
saves the values for the initial strings. After the call to .append(), it obtains the result string and
calls the stringCat() method with all three strings.
The final component of the taint tracker is the point where an output program is being generated
by the application. At the point of program generation, we again use AspectJ to call to the taint
tracker to obtain the taint information for the string passed into the method that generates the
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output program. The work of the taint tracker is currently complete and the rest is done by the
detection algorithm.

5.3

Detecting BroNIE’s
The detection algorithm is an implementation of the detection algorithm developed by Ray and

Ligatti [9] and the implementation of their algorithm that we discuss in this thesis was primarily the
work of Clayton Whitelaw. The algorithm begins with a program output string for some language
and taint information for that string. The algorithm next generates the template string counterpart
for the output string being used to generate the program. The algorithm does this by replacing all
tainted characters with ε characters. The template string is then tokenized by a modified tokenizer
for the target programming language. The modifications to the tokenizer allow it to ignore the ε
characters in the template string. We then tokenize the original output program string in the same
way, assuming that ε characters are not present in the original program output.
Now, we have 2 token streams, one from the template and one from the original. Now we
must implement the BroNIE detection algorithm from [9]. The implementation of the detection
algorithm is shown in Figure 5.3. The algorithm works by scanning through both token streams
and comparing the tokens at each index. If the tokens are the exact same or a token has been
inserted or expanded, but is noncode, the algorithm continues scanning the token streams. In any
other case, a BroNIE exception is thrown. If the end of the template string is reached first, the
program scans through any additional noncode tokens in the program string. Finally, it checks to
see if all tokens have been checked in both token streams. If they have not, then there are either
additional code tokens in the program string or there are tokens in the template string that are not
in the program string. Both of these are outlawed by the definition of a BroNIE, so an exception is
thrown. If the program passes all of these checks, the program is executed through the appropriate
application.
The security mechanism is currently complete and should fully defend against BroNIEs on Android OS. To test the mechanism, we have attempted to execute the example injection attacks
discussed in the introduction and Chapter four. All three program strings were correctly identi-
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p r i v a t e s t a t i c void c h e c k ( S t r i n g cmd ) throws B r o n i e E x c e p t i o n {
// R e t r i e v e
boolean [ ]

taint

// T o k e n i z e
Tkn [ ]

the

//

string

t h e program

string

into

its

template

t e m p l a t e = g e t T e m p l a t e S t r i n g ( cmd ) ;

// T o k e n i z e
Tkn [ ]

program

o r i = t o k e n i z e ( cmd ) ;

// C o n v e r t
String

information

t a i n t = T a i n t T r a c k e r . g e t D a t a F o r S t r i n g ( cmd ) ;

the

template

tem = t o k e n i z e ( t e m p l a t e ) ;

Initialize

int

i = 0;

int

j = 0;

indices

for

looping

through

the

token

streams

while ( i < o r i . l e n g t h && j < tem . l e n g t h ) {
i f ( o r i [ i ] . e q u a l s ( tem [ i ] ) )
// The t o k e n s

are

the

{
e x a c t same ,

c o n t i n u e on

i ++;
j ++;
} else

i f ( o r i [ i ] . i s N o n c o d e ( ) && tem [ i ] . expandsTo ( o r i [ i ] ) ) {

// The t e m p l a t e

t o k e n can e x p a n d

to

the

original

token ,

c o n t i n u e on

i ++;
j ++;
} else

if

( o r i [ i ] . isNoncode ( ) ) {

// A n o n c o d e

token

has been

injected ,

c o n t i n u e on

i ++;
} else {
// S o m e t h i n g

else

has happened ,

not

allowed ,

this

program

exhibits

a BroNIE

throw new B r o n i e E x c e p t i o n ( ” BroNIE d e t e c t e d ” ) ;
}
}

while ( i < o r i . l e n g t h && o r i [ i ] . i s N o n c o d e ( ) ) {
// A d d i t i o n a l

noncode

tokens

were

inserted ,

c o n t i n u e on

i ++;}

i f ( ! ( i >= o r i . l e n g t h && j >= tem . l e n g t h ) ) {
System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( i + ”<= ” + o r i . l e n g t h + ” , ” + j + ”<= ” + tem . l e n g t h ) ;
// Not

all

tokens

were scanned − t h i s

program

exhibits

a BroNIE

throw new B r o n i e E x c e p t i o n ( ” BroNIE d e t e c t e d ” ) ;
}
}

Figure 5.3: Algorithm to detect BroNIEs using a template string and a program string
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fied by the system as BroNIEs. Our proof-of-concept mechanism has been implemented and has
demonstrated its effectiveness against the attacks we have described.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to argue that injection attacks are both possible on Android and have
the potential to compromise the target device. We have presented evidence of several injection
attacks into Android that inject into both the OS shell and the SQLite API. The attacks we have
demonstrated include the capability to falsely authenticate to some SQLite database, the ability to
drain the mobile data allotment of the target device, the ability to modify or delete the contents of
the SD card on a device, and the ability to “forkbomb” a device. There exists a mechanism to defend
against SQL injection attacks on Android, but it is not automatic, relying on the programmer of the
application for proper implementation. There is no mechanism to defend against OS shell attacks
on Android. These attacks have the capacity to cause damage to users and we believe that they
are a problem that warrants a solution.
In pursuit of that goal, we have implemented a defense mechanism to mitigate these injection
attacks, based on Ray and Ligatti’s BroNIE definition of injection attacks [9]. We have demonstrated that the definition of a BroNIE accurately classifies our example attacks as injection attacks.
Our mechanism adds taint tracking via modification to the Java libraries used by the Andriod OS
and via automated compilation of android applications with AspectJ. We have also developed an
implementation of the detection algorithm discussed in Ray and Ligatti’s work in AspectJ to detect
injection attacks based on the taint information provided by the taint tracker.

32

LIST OF REFERENCES

[1] The MITRE Corporation.

CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors, 2011.

http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2011/2011 cwe sans top25.pdf.
[2] Pew Internet.

Mobile technology fact sheet, 2014.

http://www.pewinternet.org/face-

sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet.
[3] CISCO.

Data

leakage

worldwide:

The

high

cost

of

insider

threats,

2008.

http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/enterprise-networks/data-lossprevention/white paper c11-506224.pdf.
[4] Google. Android open source project, 2014. https://source.android.com.
[5] A. Felt, E. Chin, S. Hanna, D. Song, and D. Wagner. Android permissions demystified. In
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS,
pages 627–638, New York, NY, USA, 2011. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2046707.2046779.
[6] P. Kelley, S. Consolvo, L. Cranor, J. Jung, N. Sadeh, and D. Wetherall. A conundrum of
permissions: Installing applications on an android smartphone. In Financial Cryptography
and Data Security, volume 7398 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 68–79. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34638-5 6.
[7] Google. Sqlitedatabase class documentation, 2014. http://developer.android.com/reference
/android/database/sqlite/SQLiteDatabase.html.
[8] Open Web Application Security Project.

SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet, 2014.

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet.
[9] D. Ray and J. Ligatti. Defining injection attacks. Technical report, University of South Florida,
2014. http://www.cse.usf.edu/˜ligatti/papers/bronies.pdf.
33

[10] D. Ray and J. Ligatti. Defining code-injection attacks. In Proceedings of the Symposium on
Principles of Programming Languages, POPL, pages 179–190, 2012.
[11] W. Enck, M. Ongtang, P.D. McDaniel, et al. Understanding android security. IEEE Security
& Privacy, 7(1):50–57, 2009.
[12] T. Vidas, D. Votipka, and N. Christin. All your droid are belong to us: A survey of current
android attacks. In Women Of Our Time, WOOT, pages 81–90, 2011.
[13] C. Orthacker, P. Teufl, S. Kraxberger, G. Lackner, M. Gissing, A. Marsalek, J. Leibetseder,
and O. Prevenhueber. Android security permissions can we trust them?

In Security and

Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems, volume 94 of Lecture Notes of
the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering,
pages 40–51. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-302442 4.
[14] Y. Zhou, Z. Wang, W. Zhou, and X. Jiang. Hey, you, get off of my market: Detecting malicious
apps in official and alternative android markets. In NDSS, 2012.
[15] F. Di Cerbo, A. Girardello, F. Michahelles, and S. Voronkova. Detection of malicious applications on android os. In Computational Forensics, pages 138–149. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2011.
[16] P. Bisht, P. Madhusudan, and V. N. Venkatakrishnan. Candid: Dynamic candidate evaluations
for automatic prevention of SQL injection attacks. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 13(2):14:1–
14:39, March 2010. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1698750.1698754.
[17] Z. Su and G. Wassermann.
tions.

The essence of command injection attacks in web applica-

In Conference Record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Prin-

ciples of Programming Languages, POPL, pages 372–382, New York, NY, USA, 2006.
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1111037.1111070.
[18] G. Wassermann and Z. Su. Sound and precise analysis of web applications for injection vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design
and Implementation, PLDI, pages 32–41, 2007. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1250734.1250739.
34

[19] Oracle.

How

to

write

SQL

injection

proof

PL/SQL,

2008.

http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/features/plsql/overview/how-to-writeinjection-proof-plsql-1-129572.pdf.
[20] G.-V. Jourdan. Securing large applications against command injections. In Security Technology, 41st Annual IEEE International Carnahan Conference on, pages 69–78, 2007.
[21] W.G.J. Halfond, A Orso, and P. Manolios. Wasp: Protecting web applications using positive
tainting and syntax-aware evaluation. Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, 34(1):65–
81, Jan 2008.
[22] S. Son, K. S. McKinley, and V. Shmatikov.
with precision and efficiency.

Diglossia: detecting code injection attacks

In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC conference on Com-

puter & communications security, CCS, pages 1181–1192, New York, NY, USA, 2013.
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2508859.2516696.
[23] A. Nguyen-Tuong, S. Guarnieri, D. Greene, J. Shirley, and D. Evans. Automatically hardening
web applications using precise tainting. In Security and Privacy in the Age of Ubiquitous
Computing, IFIP 20th International Conference on Information Security (SEC), pages 295–
308, 2005.
[24] Florian N., Nenad J., Engin K., Christopher K., and Giovanni V. Cross-site scripting prevention with dynamic data tainting and static analysis. In In Proceeding of the Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium, 2007.
[25] W. Xu, S. Bhatkar, and R. Sekar.

Taint-enhanced policy enforcement:

approach to defeat a wide range of attacks.

A practical

In Proceedings of the 15th Conference

on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15, USENIX-SS, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1267336.1267345.
[26] M. Bravenboer, E. Dolstra, and E. Visser.
embeddings.

Preventing injection attacks with syntax

In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Generative Pro-

gramming and Component Engineering, GPCE, pages 3–12, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1289971.1289975.
35

[27] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, B.-G. Chun, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, P. McDaniel, and A. N. Sheth. Taintdroid: An information flow tracking system for real-time privacy monitoring on smartphones.
Commun. ACM, 57(3):99–106, March 2014. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2494522.
[28] C. Gibler, J. Crussell, J. Erickson, and H. Chen. Androidleaks: Automatically detecting
potential privacy leaks in android applications on a large scale. In Trust and Trustworthy
Computing, volume 7344 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 291–307. ACM, 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2 17.
[29] P. Hornyack, S. Han, J. Jung, S. Schechter, and D. Wetherall. These aren’t the droids you’re
looking for: Retrofitting android to protect data from imperious applications. In Proceedings of
the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS, pages 639–652,
New York, NY, USA, 2011. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2046707.2046780.
[30] Y. Zhou, X. Zhang, X. Jiang, and V. Freeh. Taming information-stealing smartphone applications (on android). In Trust and Trustworthy Computing, volume 6740 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 93–107. ACM, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21599-5 7.
[31] G. Sarwar, O. Mehani, R. Boreli, and D. Kaafar. On the effectiveness of dynamic taint analysis for protecting against private information leaks on android-based devices. In Pierangela
Samarati, editor, SECRYPT, 10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography,
pages 461–467, Reykjvik, Iceland, July 2013.
[32] Google. Android-apktool, 2014. https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool/.
[33] Oracle.

Class Runtime Javadoc,

1993.

http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api

/java/lang/Runtime.html.
[34] Oracle. Class Process Builder Javadoc, 1993. http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java
/lang/ProcessBuilder.html.

36

